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Understanding Collective Action 
ELINOR OSTROM
UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
Collective action occurs when more than one individual isrequired to contribute to an effort in order to achieve an
outcome. People living in rural areas and using natural
resources engage in collective action on a daily basis when they  
• plant or harvest food together;
• use a common facility for marketing their products;
• maintain a local irrigation system or patrol a local forest to
see that users are following rules; and 
• meet to decide on rules related to all of the above.
Frequently, however, it becomes difficult to exclude nonpar-
ticipants from benefiting from the collective action of others.
This situation creates a collective action problem for the partic-
ipants.When individuals seek out short-term benefits for them-
selves alone, they are better off when others contribute to the
collective action and they do not. In this case, they benefit
without paying the costs. Of course, if all individuals pursue
short-term, self-centered benefits, no collective benefits are
achieved.
CAN PARTICIPANTS OVERCOME THE 
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS THEY FACE?
Some theoretical treatises assume that individuals are unable to
overcome the temptation to pursue short-term,“selfish”
benefits.According to this view, effective collective action can
be achieved only if external policymakers impose government
or private ownership. It is true that appropriately designed
property rights systems can help individuals overcome collec-
tive action problems, but such systems need not always be
externally imposed or involve government or private
ownership. Indeed, efforts by national governments to impose
uniform rules on large stretches of land involving diverse
ecological and sociological systems have frequently led to
worsening natural resource conditions rather than improve-
ments. Outsiders’ efforts to impose property rights often fail to
take into account indigenous property rights and the organiza-
tions that individuals themselves have established over time.
Many local indigenous institutions have evolved as the
people affected have tried to find better ways of organizing
joint activities. Indigenous methods for engaging in collective
action have sometimes survived for centuries, through floods,
fires, pests, overpopulation, and warfare.These institutions may
not be recorded in any formal records and are frequently
unknown except to local participants.
Any effort to influence policies for managing water, range-
lands, forests, fisheries, and other natural resources must take
into account factors that increase the likelihood that individuals
will engage in their own collective action to manage local
resources. By understanding these factors and developing
policies to enhance them, national and international agencies
can increase the level of collective action generated at the local
level.The efforts of national and international agencies can then
be devoted to large-scale collective action problems that do
require their attention and effort.
Policymakers sometimes want to learn the precise formula
that will solve a particular problem. Extensive research has
shown, however, that no blueprints exist that can reliably be
used to solve collective action problems, either within or across
sectors. Instead of uniform blueprints, research has highlighted
broad design principles that have been used by successful
groups. Furthermore, researchers have identified the attributes
of groups and resources that facilitate successful solutions to
these problems.
WHAT PARTICIPANT ATTRIBUTES ARE
CONDUCIVE TO OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS?
The first characteristic of successful efforts is agreement by the
involved individuals that the problem at hand is an important
one.At first this characteristic sounds trivial, but it is not.
Government agencies frequently complain that local popula-
tions do not perceive collective action problems as either
relevant to their concerns or within their abilities to address. In
regard to the conservation of wildlife, for example, residents
living around a reserve frequently find themselves paying high
costs and receiving few benefits for the presence of the wildlife
reserve. If people’s crops are eaten, their animals are threat-
ened, and even the lives of their children are at risk, they will
need to see substantial and tangible benefits from the establish-
ment of a park before they will see any reason to engage in
collective action to preserve wildlife.
A second factor is the degree of autonomy a group has to
take collective action on its own or within a nested institutional
setting, and this factor can depend on the macro political-insti-
tutional environment in which individuals find themselves. For
many local groups, past attempts to take collective action
proved dangerous. In a highly authoritarian regime, independent
action is perceived as threatening to the center. Individuals who
have lived in such regimes for long periods of time are always
nervous about independent action, even when assured that the
regime has changed. In addition, the capacity to create a private
association without long and bureaucratic processes or
expensive filing of documents greatly enhances the capabilities
of local people to solve problems.
Other factors relate to the way users of a resource view
both the future and each other. If users have a high discount
rate in regard to a particular resource—that is, they view exit
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as a reasonable short-term option—there is little motivation
to put in extensive time and effort to create a sustainable,
long-term governance system.Those who have overcome
collective action problems usually have a relatively low
discount rate in relation to the particular problem at hand.
Secure property rights for the group can help reinforce a long-
term perspective. Participants must also have some level of
trust in the reliability of others and be willing to use broad
strategies of reciprocity. If participants fear that others are
going to take advantage of them, no one will wish to initiate
costly actions only to find that others are not reciprocating.
Prior organizational experience and the presence of supportive
local leaders also reduce the transaction costs that must be
paid before finding possible solutions.
WHAT RESOURCE SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES ARE 
CONDUCIVE TO OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS?
Overcoming collective action problems is always a challenge.
Four factors enhance the likelihood that local users will move
toward devising institutions for sustainable development:
1. The flow of resource units, such as fish, water, or forest
products, is relatively predictable.
2. Resources are scarce but not entirely destroyed.
3. Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the
resource system are available locally at reasonable costs.
4. The resource system is moderately sized.
The presence of all four conditions enhances the proba-
bility that local users can come to a common understanding of
the nature of the system they are using and of how their own
collective action can create rules about who uses how many of
the resource units and where, when, and how these uses are
allowed. It is important to note that not every group facing
favorable conditions is successful in organizing itself and
sustaining that organization over time. Nor are groups with
less positive conditions fated to fail forevermore.
Collective action problems are found within the councils
of the highest levels of government as well as those related to
local resource management. It is important for policymakers to
understand both the importance of local initiatives and the
difference that external authorities can make by enabling
groups to take initiative and experiment with diverse local
institutions and by affecting some of the conditions through
the policy environment.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Imposing top-down, detailed prescriptions for “solving” collective
action problems by policymakers located far from particular
collective action problems has rarely been a successful strategy.
National agencies can nonetheless accomplish a great deal by  
•  providing accurate information about natural resource
systems, such as groundwater replenishment rates, geolog-
ical structure, and long-term precipitation records;
•  recording key information about the behavior of wildlife
and fisheries not available to local users;
•  providing arenas for low-cost conflict resolution;
•  designing mechanisms for discourse and debate by local
users in their effort to learn from one another and
discover new strategies;
•  disseminating information about successful organizations
and the design principles that characterize them; and
•  creating institutional mechanisms that local participants can
use to organize themselves, such as through special
districts, private associations, and local/regional govern-
ments.
It is also important that policymakers not presume that
they are the only relevant actors in efforts to solve collective
action problems.They have partners if they are willing to
recognize them. 
For further reading see A. Poteete and E. Ostrom,“An
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Research Council, The Drama of the Commons (Washington,
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Institutions, and Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2000).
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